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ABSTRACT 
This work examines how changes in the information environment affect real investment 
decisions. The information contained in stock prices, accordingly to the managerial 
learning hypothesis, can guide managers’ investment decision; a deterioration in the 
informational environment should thus affect negatively decision-making. Sovereign 
credit rating downgrades, as an exogenous information shock, test this prediction by 
analyzing changes in the sensitivity of investment to stock prices, using a difference-in-
differences methodology. Following a worsening in the informational environment, 
results find a decrease in investment-to-price sensitivity. The decrease in the 
investment-to-price sensitivity is stronger for investment grade rating home 
government’ firms, than for non-investment grade rating home government’ firms, 
following a worsening in the informational environment. Results also evidence that the 
stock price of investment grade rating home government’ firms have negative and 
statistically significant relationship with investment. Finally, results document an 
increase on the investment-to-price sensitivity during the late 2000’s crisis relative to 
the period before, but a higher decrease following a worsening in the macroeconomic 
fundamentals. 
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RESUMO 
Este trabalho examina como as mudanças no ambiente de informação afectam as 
decisões de investimento reais. A informação contida nos preços das acções, de acordo 
com a managerial learning hypothesis , pode direccionar as decisões de investimento 
dos gestores; então, uma deterioração do ambiente informacional deve afectar  a tomada 
de decisões de forma negativa. Os downgrades nos ratings dos créditos soberanos são 
considerados um choque informacional exógeno, para testar a previsão anterior, 
analisando as mudanças na sensibilidade do investimento para os preços das acções, 
utilizando uma metodologia de diferenças em diferenças. Na sequência da deterioração 
do ambiente informacional, os resultados encontram uma diminuição na sensibilidade 
investimento-preço. Na sequência de um agravamento do ambiente informacional, a 
diminuição da sensibilidade do investimento-preço é mais forte nas empresas cujos 
governos estão classificados como nível de investimento do que para as empresas cujos 
governos estão classificados como nível de não investimento. Os resultados também 
revelam que o preço das acções das empresas, cujos governos estão classificados como 
nível de investimento, tem uma relação negativa e estatisticamente significativa com o 
investimento. Finalmente, os resultados documentam um aumento na sensibilidade do 
investimento para preços durante a crise dos finais dos anos de 2000, em relação ao 
período anterior, mas um decréscimo mais elevado após uma deterioração nos 
fundamentos macroeconómicos. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the late 2000s the European sovereign debt crisis took place in several member states 
of the eurozone, characterized by rising levels of debt and overly high sovereign 
structural deficits. It means that these states not only were rising debt but also already 
facing concerns about how to repay it, refinance their government debt or help 
overindebted banks that were on the national command. Thus, these states had to resort 
to third-party assistance such as the International Monetary Fund and other entities. 
The complications that these states faced were triggered by the Greek situation, where 
their problems were being covered up to fulfill Maastricht’s criteria of limiting the 
deficit spending and the debt levels were revealed. Investors started to fear sovereign 
defaults of other member-states which lead to a wave of downgrades of these sovereign 
debt states and lead also to concerns about future debt sustainability requiring higher 
interest rates. 
In the aftermath of this crisis some developed countries experienced downgrades, even 
such countries as USA and France, who were downgraded from AAA for the first time 
in history. 
In this work, I intend to test the prediction of the “managerial learning hypothesis” 
studying the impact of the sovereign credit rating downgrades as an exogenous shock to 
the information environment on real investment decisions, specifically on investment-
to-price sensibility, with a difference-in-differences methodology. First, I perform basic 
test whether stock investment-to-price sensibility changes after a sovereign downgrade. 
Second, I explore whether investment-to-price sensibility changes around the late 2000s 
crisis. Finally, I examine whether investment-to-price sensibility changes between 
investment grades and non-investment grades. 
This work finds: first, a decrease, statistically significant, in the investment-to-price 
sensibility after a worsening in the informational environment due to a sovereign credit 
rating downgrade; second, a lower decrease in the investment-to-price sensibility after a 
sovereign credit rating downgrade in non-investment grades; finally, a higher decrease 
in the investment-to-price sensibility during late 2000’s crisis, after a sovereign credit 
rating downgrade. Evidence suggests that sovereign credit rating downgrades affect 
investment and that can lead to harder access to the capital markets.  
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A sovereign credit rating downgrade is an exogenous information shock that is 
associated, at least, to a stable information environment, though may be associated with 
a deterioration of the informational environment. If informational environment is 
negatively affected, the lower price informativeness won’t provide the most accurate 
signals to managers and decision makers. Thus, sovereign credit rating downgrades may 
lead to inefficient decision making.  
Results are consistent with the expectations and are an extra support to the managerial 
learning hypothesis, but the possibility of other omitted factors may interfere cannot be 
ruled out. Though, several robustness tests, as alternative measures of investments and 
alternative proxies of downgrades, were performed and the results hold (in most of 
them). 
This work contributes to the literature of macroeconomic factors’ effects, as sovereign 
credit rating downgrades, on the informational role of market prices, showing that it has 
negative effects on the optimal allocation resources. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Each individual has his/her own consumption and investment preference, creating a 
subjective time preference rate between the present and the future. Therefore, there are 
several subjective interest rates. 
The capital markets allow efficient funds transfers between all the participants, creating 
endogenously a unique market interest rate that is used by all in their consumption 
and/or investment decision making. 
On the one hand, markets allow access to higher utility levels for borrowing institutions 
with insufficient funds to undertake certain projects, influencing the wealth 
maximization of its shareholders. On the other hand, the market-determined interest rate 
is an important piece of information for manager’s investment decisions, because the 
return of the investment project should at least match the opportunity cost of capital. 
Capital asset pricing model is used to evaluate the expected return for each security and 
only needs non-systematic risk, which is the risk related to the microeconomic 
component. Any deviation from the expected return is interpreted as an abnormal return, 
but it’s only interpreted as an evidence of inefficiency if such deviation is persistent. 
However, it has been expanded (for example: Fama and French three factor model) and 
an alternative model was built, the arbitrage pricing theory, which uses the expected 
return of the risky security and the risk premium of several macroeconomic factors. 
 The efficiency of capital markets relies on arbitrageurs’ ability to recognize the 
mispriced securities in order to profit from it, leading prices to an equilibrium value 
consistent with relevant available information. Most of the evidences suggest that 
capital markets are efficient in its’ weak and semi-strong forms. 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) suggest that stock prices just reflect a subset of all 
relevant information, because it is costly to collect private information. Though, if the 
costs decrease, informed trading increases leading to more information contained on 
stock prices. 
Outside investors have less information than managers, but stock prices can still be 
informative and relevant for managers as long as they don’t have perfect information 
4 
 
about all decision’ factors, consistent with Bond et al. (2012). Outside investors and 
speculators may be collectively more informed than managers, because stock prices 
aggregate all the information, they can be informative and relevant, as Grossman (1976) 
and Hellwig (1980) shows. Therefore, the more investors there are the more 
competitiveness among them, leading a more informative price to managers.  
Fama and Miller (1972) evidence that higher stock price informativeness enable 
superior decision-making and influence real decisions such as investment. Foucault and 
Frésard (2011) is one example of the growing literature that highlights the informational 
feedback of stock prices suggesting that managers can learn from the information 
contained in stock prices. If so firms can make more efficient investment decisions. 
An exogenous shock on the informational environment that increases the cost of 
obtaining private information, such as sovereign credit rating downgrades may do, can 
lead to lower informativeness of stock prices to manager; making it harder for managers 
to make the best decision. Therefore, agency ratings have the important role of 
accessing the rating of a debt issuer, which is related to its’ default risk and to its’ 
ability to repay the debt issued, through a grade system.  
There are several studies that evidence which information is used by agency ratings 
when assessing it sovereign ratings. While Cantor and Packer (1996) conclude that they 
aggregate all the macroeconomic information, Afonso (2003), Bissoondoyal-Bheenick 
(2005) and Afonso, Gomes and Rother (2011) evidence that external debt, public debt 
level, government balance, GDP per capita and real GDP growth are the main factors.  
Credit rating changes should reflect changes in the risk profile that are likely to be 
permanent (consistent with the normative of the long term perspective), working as a 
reaction and not as predictor, as Sy (2003) concludes. However, rating agencies are 
known to have a pro-cyclical behavior which destabilizes the market, because 
downgrades occur after bad performance periods and upgrades occur after market 
rallies, as Ferri, Liu and Stiglitz (1999) and Kaminskiy and Schmukler (2002) show. 
Sovereign credit rating downgrades mean an increase on the default risk and occur after 
bad performance periods, leading to an expected negative stock market reaction on 
stock prices and an expected increase on the interest rates, as Holthausen and Leftwich 
(1986) show. Griffin and Sanvicente (1982) also evidence that downgrades lead to 
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negative stock market reactions on stock prices. Goh and Ederington (1999) go further 
and conclude that negative stock market reactions are higher in and into non-investment 
grades.  
Ratings can affect the pool of investors, since there might be some type of investors 
(such as mutual funds investors) who under a certain level won't invest due to its 
investment policies. However, most of the investors just require higher interest rates to 
compensate their exposure to higher default risk. 
Durbin and Ng (2005) show that firms with higher foreign revenue and firms who are 
linked to a foreign firm or linked to the home government have a better position (lower 
spreads) on the bond markets than the home government. 
The sovereign ceiling shouldn’t be a determinant rule otherwise it would carry real  
effects to some firms, though investors use it as convenient and intuitive aids in valuing 
projects in contexts of asymmetric information, transparency problems or costly private 
information. 
Almeida et al. (2014) study the sovereign credit rating downgrades effects, using the 
sovereign ceiling policies, on financial policy and on firm investment, concluding that 
downgrades lead to an increase in corporate bond yields and to large decreases in 
investment and leverage. Afonso, Furceri and Gomes (2012) evidence that downgrades 
announced by the main rating agencies can lead to harder access to the capital markets. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Investment-to-price sensitivity should decrease, or at least maintain 
equal, following a credit rating downgrade, ceteris paribus. 
By the managerial learning hypothesis, following an informational shock that declines 
the informational content of stock prices for managers, investment-to-price sensitivity is 
expected to decrease, or at least to maintain equal. 
 
 Hypothesis 2: Investment-to-price sensitivity should decrease less in non-investment 
grades following a credit rating downgrade, ceteris paribus. 
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Non-investment grades are expected to have lower negative effects on the investment-
to-price sensitivity following an information shock, by the managerial learning 
hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Investment-to-price sensitivity should decrease more after the crisis than 
before the crisis following a credit rating downgrade, ceteris paribus. 
The decrease on the investment-to-price sensitivity is expected to be higher following 
an information shock for the crisis period, by the managerial learning hypothesis. 
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3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
3.1 Sample description 
The impact of a sovereign credit rating downgrade on investment-to-price sensitivity 
will be examined for 18 countries: Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and United Kingdom (Region 1 – “Europe”);  
Canada and Mexico (Region 2 – “North and Central America”); Argentina, Brazil and 
Colombia (Region 3 – “South America”); and Egypt, Indonesia and Russia (Region 4 – 
“Rest of the world”)  
Data was collected from DataStream/WorldScope since January 1997 until December 
2011, in an annual basis. From DataStream collect market value of equity (MV), while 
from Worldscope collect on each firm’s total assets (WC02999), capital expenditures 
(WC04601), property plant and equipment (WC02501), book value of equity 
(WC05476), common shares outstanding (WC05301), net income (WC01751), 
depreciation and amortization (WC01151), EBITDA (WC18198), R&D (WC01201) 
sales (WC01001). Accordingly to the literature, regulated industries (utilities and 
financial, 4-digit SIC codes (WC07024) firms’ between 4900-4949 and 6000-6999) 
have been excluded. Though, SIC code 2-digit (WC07022) has higher number of 
observations on the sample data than 4-digit SIC code, so I use WC07022 that allows a 
higher number of observations, which affects the estimation accuracy. However, from 
WC07022 I just use the two first digits to control for industry. Missing firm-year values 
on total assets, sales and capital expenditure were excluded. Firms with total assets 
lower than 10000 and with negative sales and with less than three years of information 
are dropped. To minimize the impact of outliers on variables, it is winsorized at the top 
and bottom 1% level. 
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Table 1: Sample Description 
    Sample Deterioration 
  #firms %firms #firmyears #firmyears 
Argentina 70 2.12 791 195 
Austria 56 1.86 694 0 
Brazil 267 7.05 2626 283 
Canada 617 15.27 5687 0 
Colombia 36 0.77 288 118 
Croatia 84 1.52 565 0 
Czech Republic 12 0.33 123 33 
Egypt 150 2.82 1050 1002 
Germany 765 21.63 8058 0 
Greece 202 4.32 1609 1418 
Indonesia 374 10.2 3801 807 
Ireland 48 1.42 529 135 
Mexico 104 3.15 1173 269 
Netherlands 112 3.69 1374 0 
Portugal 45 1.4 523 85 
Russia 506 8.64 3218 1409 
Spain 107 3.25 1212 204 
United Kingdom 428 10.56 3933 0 
Total 3983 100 37254 5958 
 
This table describes the number of firm-year observations (“#firm-years”) that occurred 
a deterioration of the macroeconomic fundamentals until its’ recovery and the number 
of firm-year observations that enter in the control group by country. The sample period 
is from 1997 to 2011.  
 
The variable “deterioration” is a dummy variable that assumes the value 1 for the 
periods after a sovereign credit rating downgrade until its’ rating improves. After a 
rating improvement it will assume the value 0. Another alternative sovereign credit 
rating downgrade measures will be used to test the robustness of the results. Those, 
alternative measures are: “bigdown1” is a dummy variable that assumes the value 1 if in 
a period of one year the downgrade was at least equivalent to 3 notches, and assumes 
the value 0 otherwise; “bigdown2” is a dummy variable that assumes the value 1 if in a 
period of two years the downgrade was at least equivalent to 3 notches, and assumes the 
value 0 otherwise; and “downgrade” is a dummy that assumes the value 1 if in year t the 
rating is lower than the year t-1 rating. 
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Sovereign credit ratings data comes from Fitch rating agency and are converted as the 
following table: 
Table 2: Ratings – numerical scale 
AAA 24 A 19 BB+ 14 B- 9 C 4 
AA+ 23 A- 18 BB 13 CCC+ 8 RD 3 
AA 22 BBB+ 17 BB- 12 CCC 7 DDD 2 
AA- 21 BBB 16 B+ 11 CCC- 6 DD 1 
A+ 20 BBB- 15 B 10 CC 5 D 0 
  
Sovereign credit ratings from AAA (24) rating to BBB- (15) rating are considered to be 
investment grades. Below BBB- rating it is considered to be non-investment grades. 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
  Control 
  mean median sd N 
Rating 20.222 23.000 4.743 31294 
TA 5476240.000 198785.000 51200000.000 31294 
Q 0.497 0.497 0.624 25475 
Investment 3.420 0.158 151.285 28019 
CF 16263.260 1127.946 90785.100 30130 
          
  Treatment 
  mean median sd N 
Rating 14.349 16.000 4.249 5958 
TA 2164570.000 184919.500 13400000.000 5958 
Q 0.543 0.532 0.412 4838 
Investment 0.565 0.084 11.056 5431 
CF 8697.561 668.086 52292.970 5585 
          
  Full Sample 
  mean median sd N 
Rating 19.283 20.000 5.140 37252 
TA 4946579.000 195986.000 47300000.000 37252 
Q 0.504 0.502 0.596 30313 
Investment 2.956 0.146 138.535 33450 
CF 15080.160 1038.394 85954.400 35715 
 
This table reports the mean, median and standard deviation of the main variables used in 
the analysis, provided separately for treatment group firms (Downgrade) and control 
10 
 
group firms, which are the ones that didn’t registered a downgrade in that year. The 
sample period is from 1997 to 2011.  
 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for investment grades and non-investment grades 
   Non-investment grade rating 
  mean median sd N 
Rating 11.457 12.000 2.813 7796 
TA 1263188.000 170405.500 5318442.000 7796 
Q 0.543 0.496 1.104 6441 
Investment 2.028 0.098 77.484 6895 
CF 6635.175 889.050 25493.740 7352 
          
  Investment grade rating 
  mean median sd N 
Rating 21.354 24.000 3.289 29458 
TA 5921688.000 205076.500 53000000.000 29458 
Q 0.494 0.503 0.348 23873 
Investment 3.197 0.158 150.390 26554 
CF 17268.630 1087.791 95452.990 28364 
          
  Full Sample 
  mean median sd N 
Rating 19.283 20.000 5.140 37254 
TA 4946822.000 195986.000 47300000.000 37254 
Q 0.504 0.502 0.596 30314 
Investment 2.956 0.146 138.537 33449 
CF 15079.770 1038.708 85953.220 35716 
 
This table reports the mean, median and standard deviation of the main variables used in 
the analysis, provided separately for investment grades and non-investment grades. The 
sample period is from 1997 to 2011.  
 
 
The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) says that the crisis started at 
December 2007 and lasted till June 2009. However some countries faced the crisis for a 
higher period, so “after” dummy variable will be used as a time reference for the latest 
crisis, allowing evidences between the period before and the period after 2007. 
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3.2 Methodology to measure the investment-to-price sensitivity 
The main goal of this work is to measure the investment-to-price sensitivity of a 
sovereign credit rating downgrade, so I will employ the difference-in-differences 
methodology. 
The baseline regression model is given by: 
                                                                 
   
       
       
                      
Where, firm and year are represented by i and t, respectively. The dependent variable Ii,t 
is the corporate investment measure, given by capital expenditures over lagged plant, 
property and equipment. Deterioration is the dummy variable of interest. Tobins’ Q, 
represented by Qi,t-1, is the normalized stock price in year t-1 of the firm i and is 
measured as the market value of equity plus the total assets minus the book value of 
equity, scaled by book assets. 
The baseline model includes some control variables as log (TAi,t-1), proxy for firm size, 
which reflects 2011 prices, and cash flow (CF i,t-1), given by net income plus 
depreciation and amortization – that has a relationship with investment well 
documented – since are known variables to affect investment decisions. Notice that cash 
flow must be divided by total assets, as baseline model equation shows. 
The marginal effect of a sovereign credit rating downgrade (Deteriorationi,t-1) on the 
investment of firm i is given by: 
      
                   
              
Is expected that investment-to-price sensitivity to have an ambiguous prediction after a 
downgrade, expecting to decrease when the set of investors that collect new private 
information is negatively affected. Higher effects are expected in investment-grades and 
in bear markets. 
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4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In this section, I will examine whether the hypothesis formulated before about the 
relationship between sovereign credit rating downgrades and the investment-to-price 
sensibility. 
 
4.1 Hypothesis 1: Investment-to-price sensitivity should decrease, or at least 
maintain equal, following a credit rating downgrade, ceteris paribus. 
Table 5 displays, from various specifications of the baseline model, the relationship 
between investment-to-price sensitivity and sovereign credit rating downgrades.  After a 
sovereign credit rating downgrade, most of the investors require a higher interest rate in 
order to compensate the higher risk. However, it might lead to a decrease in the pool of 
investors. If it happens the capital markets may become less competitive, therefore the 
price may not be the equilibrium price for the relevant available information, reducing 
the price informativeness. Concluding, investment-to-price sensibility should decrease, 
or at least be equal, after a sovereign credit rating as stock prices.  
As expected investment is positively related to stock price (Q), because market’s 
feedback is useful for managers’ investment decision. The coefficient on Qi,t-1 is 
statistically significant at 1% level in all model specifications. 
Control group firms aren’t expected to have such decrease in investment-to-price 
sensibility, because their home government didn’t suffer an exogenous shock on the 
informational environment. 
The coefficient of the variable of interest β3 (Qt-1 x Deteriorationt-1) is expected to be 
negative and captures the investment-to-price sensibility variation for a period of 
worsening perspectives, after a sovereign credit rating downgrade, for the treatment 
group relatively to the control group. 
The results in Table 5 show that the main coefficient is negative and statistically 
significant as expected, suggesting a decrease in investment-to-price sensitivity 
following a deterioration of the macroeconomic fundamental until a recovery (upgrade) 
for the treatment group. If I take the coefficients in the baseline model as an example, an 
increase of one standard deviation in Q (0.596 – from Table 2) is associated with a 
13 
 
0.008 increase (0.013 x 0.596) in investment, which represents, for the average firm, a 
0,271% increase ((2.956+0.008)/2.956) in investment prior to the worsening period. 
After it, an increase of one standard deviation in Q is associated a -0.044 decrease 
((0.013 + -0.086) x 0.596), for the average treatment firm, which represents 98,512% of 
the previous value ((2.956-0.044)/ 2.956). So, it means a 1.488% decrease ( 1- (2.956-
0.044)/ 2.956) in investment. 
Total assets logarithm (firm size’ proxy), have the expected sign documented in prior 
studies, which is negative. While cash flows over firm size’ proxy is zero. Both control 
variables are statistically significant in all of the three specifications.   
Robustness tests of the above results were checked in several ways. In column (2), 
baseline model was re-estimated using just year and firm fixed effects. The coefficient 
on the interaction between Q and deterioration (main result) stills negative and 
statistically significant. As the inclusion of firm fixed effects doesn’t statistically 
significant change the magnitude of coefficient β3, pooled Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regressions in the rest of this work will be used, preserving the efficiency of the 
estimates, as Foucault and Frésard (2011) do. In column (3), baseline model was re-
estimated with random country effects. Once again, the main result remains similar to 
the baseline specification.  
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Table 5 - Sovereign credit rating downgrade and firms’ investment-to-price 
sensitivity 
 
 
 
This table presents the estimation of baseline model with various estimation techniques. 
The dependent variable is investment, defined as capital expenditures divided by lagged 
Investment (capex over lagged PPE) 
baseline Firm FE Country RE 
(1) (2) (3) 
Qt-1 0.01293*** 0.01366*** 0.01274*** 
(5.5677) (5.5652) (5.9851) 
Deteriorationt-1 -0.04797 -0.06765** -0.06453* 
 
(-1.2978) (-2.4298) (-1.9830) 
Qt-1 x Deteriorationt-1 -0.08549* -0.07743** -0.07974* 
 
(-1.8128) (-2.3331) (-1.7495) 
CF / log(TA) t-1 0.00000*** 0.00000*** 0.00000*** 
 
(3.5919) (6.7568) (3.8078) 
log (TA) t-1 -0.04365*** -0.05083*** -0.04364*** 
 
(-6.3577) (-12.4550) (-5.9556) 
Constant 0.86201*** 0.92946*** 0.82975*** 
 
(8.2208) (17.6152) (7.7645) 
    Region Fixed Effects Yes No No 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes No Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects No Yes No 
    Observations 19,764 26,046 19,764 
R-squared 0.036 0.036 0.032 
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property, plant and equipment (PPE). Deterioration is a dummy variable that is equal to 
one after sovereign downgrades until the rating increase again, assuming then the value 
zero. In column (1), estimate baseline model with pooled OLS regressions with region, 
year and industry fixed effects. In column (2), re-estimate baseline model with firm 
fixed effects and without region and industry fixed effects. In column (3), estimate 
baseline model by including region random effects. The sample period is from 1997 to 
2011. The standard errors used to compute the t-statistics (in brackets) are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and within-firm clustering. Symbols ***, ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
In Table 6, the robustness of the previous findings with alternative investment measures 
was checked. Investment was defined as the ratio of capital expenditures (Capex) to 
lagged fixed assets, in the baseline equation. The five alternatives to measure the 
investment are: Capex over contemporaneous (1) and lagged assets (2); the sum of 
Capex and R&D expenses over contemporaneous assets (3) and lagged assets (4); and 
the annual change of total assets, scaled by lagged assets.  
The interaction between Q and Deterioration, observe negative coefficients in the five 
alternative measures. However, at fifth alternative measure it isn’t statistically 
significant. 
The coefficient Qt-1 and the cash flow control variable are positive and zero, 
respectively, and statistically significant in all alternatives. Firm size control variable is 
negative in four measures, but statistically significant just in three.  
 
Table 6: Alternative investment measures – robustness tests 
 
Investment (alternative measures) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Qt-1 
0.00063** 0.00116*** 0.00073** 0.00135*** 0.00804*** 
 
(2.5959) (3.8432) (2.0439) (3.3274) (8.4015) 
Deteriorationt-1 
0.00147 -0.00081 -0.00522* -0.00737* -0.05367*** 
 
(0.5754) (-0.2312) (-1.8996) (-1.9370) (-3.7285) 
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Qt-1 x 
Deteriorationt-1 
-0.01826*** -0.01851*** -0.01563*** -0.01546*** -0.02481 
 
(-8.1069) (-6.0995) (-5.9149) (-4.2169) (-0.9766) 
CF / log (TA) t-1 
0.00000*** 0.00000*** 0.00000*** 0.00000*** 0.00000*** 
 
(4.0065) (4.9161) (6.9312) (6.7109) (5.8729) 
log (TA) t-1 
0.00086 -0.00092 -0.00261** -0.00520*** -0.02922*** 
 
(1.0554) (-0.8216) (-2.4118) (-3.4095) (-7.0564) 
Constant 
0.03701*** 0.05907*** 0.09210*** 0.12318*** 0.34452*** 
 
(3.4972) (4.0983) (6.4866) (6.3022) (6.5475) 
      Region Fixed 
Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed 
Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed 
Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed 
Effects No No No No No 
      
Observations 
19,943 19,943 19,943 19,943 19,943 
R-squared 
0.034 0.034 0.046 0.055 0.164 
 
In this table baseline model was estimated using various measures of investment with 
pooled OLS regressions. In columns (1) and (2) investment is defined as capital 
expenditures divided by lagged and contemporaneous total assets, respectively. In 
columns (3) and (4) investment is defined as capital expenditures plus R&D expenses 
divided by lagged and contemporaneous total assets, respectively. Finally, in column (5) 
investment is defined as the annual change in total assets divided by lagged total assets. 
Across all specifications, Deterioration is a dummy variable that is equal to one after 
sovereign downgrades until the rating increase again, assuming then the value zero. The 
sample period is from 1997 to 2011. All estimations include region, year and industry 
fixed effects. The standard errors used to compute the t-statistics (in brackets) are 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and within-firm clustering. Symbols ***, ** and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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In Table 7, the findings were checked about the robustness with different proxies for the 
sovereign credit rating downgrades, already explained previously in section “Data and 
Methodology”. Irrespective of the downgrade measure – “downgradet-1” (column 1), 
“bigdown1” (column 2) and “bigdown2” (column 3) – the interactions between Q and 
the variables of interest have negative but not statistically significant results. 
 
 
Table 7: Alternative sovereign credit rating downgrade measures 
 
Investment (capex over lagged PPE) 
 
Downgradet-1 Bigdown1 Bigdown2 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Qt-1 
0.01285*** 0.01281*** 0.01281*** 
 
(5.2369) (5.0845) (5.0803) 
Downgradet-1 
-0.05341 
  
 
(-1.1307) 
  
Bigdown1 
 
-0.04965 
 
  
(-0.3411) 
 
Bigdown2 
  
-0.05088 
   
(-0.3497) 
Qt-1 x Downgradet-1 
-0.09906 
  
 
(-1.4709) 
  
Qt-1 x Bigdown1 
 
-0.12208 
 
  
(-0.5268) 
 
Qt-1 x Bigdown2 
  
-0.11759 
   
(-0.5074) 
CF / log (TA) t-1 
0.00000*** 0.00000*** 0.00000*** 
 
(3.8536) (3.9206) (3.9195) 
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Log (TA) t-1 
-0.04423*** -0.04490*** -0.04490*** 
 
(-6.3445) (-6.3879) (-6.3855) 
Constant 
0.86381*** 0.86530*** 0.86526*** 
 
(8.0830) (8.0295) (8.0279) 
    Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects No No No 
    Observations 19,764 19,764 19,764 
R-squared 0.035 0.033 0.033 
 
 
In this table baseline model was estimated using various measures of investment with 
pooled OLS regressions. In columns (1), the variable downgrade assumes value one if 
in the period before sovereign credit rating suffered a downgrade, and zero otherwise. In 
columns (2) and (3) the variable is defined by a downgrade of three notches in the 
previous year before and two previous years before, respectively. The sample period is 
from 1997 to 2011. All estimations include region, year and industry fixed effects. The 
standard errors used to compute the t-statistics (in brackets) are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and within-firm clustering. Symbols ***, ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
4.2. Hypothesis 2: Investment-to-price sensitivity should decrease less in non-
investment grades following a credit rating downgrade, ceteris paribus. 
 
Table 8 displays the relationship between investment-to-price sensitivity and sovereign 
credit rating downgrades, according to the category of the rating. Ratings are divided 
into two groups:  first group is the home government investment grade rating – from 
AAA (24) rating to BBB- (15) rating; second group is the home government non-
investment grade rating – under BBB- (15) rating. 
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When an investment opportunity is identified, the manager assesses whether the project 
worth more than the capital needed to undertake, using methods as NPV, where the cost 
of capital has a relevant role. Through external financing is possible to reduce the cost 
of capital of a company, which means that the possibility of using the capital markets 
will influence investment decisions. As firms of low home government rating countries 
(second group) could find themselves deprived of access to the capital market and also 
may face more difficulties to survive, it is expected to have a positive sensitive to the 
prices informativeness. First group firms are also expected to have positive but lower 
sensitive to the prices informativeness. After a sovereign credit rating downgrade is 
expected that investment grade ratings to suffer a more relevant decrease in investment-
to-prices sensitivity, because non investment grades already faced before some of the 
new issues that investment grades didn’t. 
As expected investment is positively related to stock price (Q), because market’s 
feedback that is useful for managers when they have an investment decision. The 
coefficient on Qi,t-1 is statistically significant at 1% level in all model specifications. 
However, for first group firms the effects of stock price on investment is -0.1012 
(0.0141 + (-0.1153)), which wasn’t expected. Table 4 shows that investment grade 
sensitivity is negative and statistically significant before the exogenous shock. It might 
happen because the average size for the first groups is higher, which might reflect some 
empire building decisions, for example. However, it should be deeply explored in 
another work. 
After a worsening in the macroeconomic fundamentals, given by a sovereign credit 
rating downgrade, first group [(0.0141 + -0.0147 + -0.1153 + -0.1110) = -0.227] and 
second group [(0.0141 + -0.0147) = -0.006], both evidence a negative relationship 
between stock price (Q) and investment. As expected investment grade ratings have 
higher negative effects on this relationship. 
The results in Table 8 show that the coefficient is negative but it isn’t statistically 
significant for the investment-to-price sensitivity after the informational environment 
shock (Qt-1 x Deteriorationt-1). It also show that investment grade ratings have negative 
and statistically significant coefficients on investment-to-price sensitivity before (Qt-1 x 
Invratt-1) and after (Qt-1 x Deteriorationt-1 x Invratt-1) the informational environment 
shock. Total assets logarithm (firm size’ proxy), have the expected sign documented in 
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prior studies, which is negative. While cash flows over firm size’ proxy is zero. Both 
control variables are statistically significant. 
 
Table 8: Effects in investment grade and in non-investment grade 
 
 
Investment (capex over lagged PPE) 
 
“Invrat” 
  (1) 
Qt-1 
0.01410*** 
 
(10.0685) 
Deteriorationt-1 
-0.04422 
 
(-1.2142) 
Qt-1 x deteriorationt-1 
-0.01470 
 
(-0.3837) 
Invratt-1 
0.14424*** 
 
(5.7249) 
Qt-1 x Invratt-1 
-0.11526*** 
 
(-3.5482) 
Qt-1 x deteriorationt-1 x 
invratt-1 
-0.11104*** 
 
(-2.8095) 
CF / log (TA) t-1 
0.00000*** 
 
(3.4210) 
Log (TA) t-1 
-0.04014*** 
 
(-6.5624) 
Constant 
0.73609*** 
 
(7.6650) 
  Region Fixed Effects Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes 
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Firm Fixed Effects No 
  
Observations 
19,764 
R-squared 
0.040 
 
 
Table 8 shows the estimated effects of a downgrade in investment grade and in non-
investment grade. Deterioration is a dummy variable that is equal to one after sovereign 
downgrades until the rating increase again, assuming then the value zero. Invrat is a 
dummy variable that takes value one if there it’s an investment-grade sovereign rating, 
and zero otherwise. The sample period is from 1997 to 2011. All estimations include 
region, year and industry fixed effects. The standard errors used to compute the t-
statistics (in brackets) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and within-firm clustering. 
Symbols ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 
4.3. H3: Investment-to-price sensitivity should decrease more after the crisis than 
before the crisis following a credit rating downgrade, ceteris paribus. 
 
Table 9 displays the relationship between investment-to-price sensitivity and sovereign 
credit rating downgrades before and after the late 2000’s crisis. “After” is a dummy 
variable that assumes the value one if it’s after the year 2007, and zero otherwise. It 
isn’t possible to affirm that there aren’t other unobservable factors that influence the 
coefficients.  
Most of the literature suggests that capital markets are efficient in the weak and 
semistrong form, so prices reflect all the relevant available information. So prices 
should be positively related with investment. Though, in a bull market it’s possible that 
managers pay less attention to market prices informativeness than in a bear market, due 
to the marginal effects. This idea is similar to the idea that the risk aversion has an 
ambiguous pattern, where the marginal effect of losses may be higher than the marginal 
effects of gains for the same unity variation. So it is expected that after the crisis prices 
informativeness become more relevant in managers’ investment decision.  
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The influence of omitted factors cannot be ruled out, because there may be other events 
that improve the price informativeness. One event that improves the price 
informativeness is for example IFRS adoption. Loureiro and Taboada (2014) evidence 
that IFRS adoption, which is an exogenous informational shock that contributes to 
higher transparency. The expected trend is that prices will improve its’ informativeness, 
through several channels as legislation improvements, higher transparency, among 
others.  
Investment-to-price sensitivity, as it was expected, isn’t statistically significant because 
– despite market’s feedback be useful for managers when they have an investment 
decision – during a bull market it might not be that relevant as it should in managers’ 
investment decision. After the crisis, investment is positively related to stock price (Q) 
consistent with my expectations. 
An exogenous shock on the informational environment, such as a sovereign credit rating 
downgrade, is expected to decrease the price informativeness for managers. Though, the 
investment-to-price sensibility is negative and not statistically significant, before (Qt-1 x 
Deteriorationt-1) and after (Qt-1 x Deteriorationt-1 x After), against what was expected. 
 Total assets logarithm (firm size’ proxy), have the expected sign documented in prior 
studies, which is negative. While cash flows over firm size’ proxy is zero. Both control 
variables are statistically significant. 
Table 9: Effects in investment-to-price sensitivity after the late 2000’s crisis 
 
 
Investment (capex over lagged PPE) 
 
After 
  (1) 
Qt-1 
-0.01962 
 
(-1.1782) 
Deteriorationt-1 
-0.05486 
 
(-1.6431) 
After 
- 
  
Deteriorationt-1 x After 
0.00274 
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(0.0524) 
Qt-1 x Deteriorationt-1 
-0.04702 
 
(-1.4592) 
Qt-1 x After 
0.03443** 
 
(2.0644) 
Qt-1 x Deteriorationt-1 x After 
-0.05043 
 
(-0.5743) 
CF / log (TA) t-1 
0.00000*** 
 
(3.6075) 
Log (TA) t-1 
-0.04281*** 
 
(-6.3870) 
Constant 
0.86091*** 
 
(8.2950) 
  Region Fixed Effects Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects No 
  Observations 19,764 
R-squared 0.037 
 
Table 9 presents the estimated effects of a downgrade during the late 2000’s crisis. 
Deterioration is a dummy variable that is equal to one after sovereign downgrades until 
the rating increase again, assuming then the value zero. After is a dummy variable that 
takes value one if it is later than 2007, and zero otherwise. The sample period is from 
1997 to 2011. All estimations include country, year and industry fixed effects. The 
standard errors used to compute the t-statistics (in brackets) are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and within-firm clustering. Symbols ***, ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
This work contributes to the effects of macroeconomic factors’ literature, such as 
sovereign credit rating downgrades, on the informational role of market prices, showing 
that prices are a relevant system of signals for managers’ investment decisions, allowing 
optimal allocation of the resources. Though, despite most of the literature shows that 
prices reflect all the relevant information available results suggest that in a bull market it 
isn’t relevant for managers’ investment decisions. 
Results about the positive relationship between stock prices (Q) and investment are 
robust for several alternative investment measures and for several alternative variables 
that change how downgrades are measured. 
The five alternative investment measures evidence that stock prices are positively (and 
statistically significant) related to investment, while a worsening in informational 
environment affects negatively this relationship, but just in four of the five 
specifications it’s statistically significant. 
The three alternative proxies for downgrades show that investment-to-price sensitivity 
is in all of them positive and statistically significant. Following a worsening in the 
informational environment, if a three notches downgrade is measured, in the previous 
year or in the two previous years, then it isn’t statistically significant. If a downgrade is 
just measured accordingly to the year before rating variation then it also won’t be 
statistically significant. 
Home government investment grade rating’ firms evidence a negative relationship 
between stock price (Q) and investment, while non-investment grade home government 
rating’ evidence a positive relationship. It might be explained by empire building issues, 
since the average firm of the first type has a higher firm size relative to the second type 
average firm. After a worsening in the informational environment both present negative 
relationship, but first type firms present a higher negative effect. 
Results document an increase on the investment-to-price sensitivity during the late 
2000’s crisis relative (bear market) to the period before (bull market), but a higher 
decrease following a worsening in the macroeconomic fundamentals.  
25 
 
6. Bibliographic References  
Afonso, A., 2003. Understanding the determinants of sovereign debt ratings : evidence 
for the two leading agencies, Journal of Economics and Finance, 27 (1) : 56-74.  
Afonso, A., Furceri, D., Gomes, P., 2012. Sovereign credit ratings and financial markets 
linkages: Application to European data. Journal of International Money and Finance 
31, 606-638.  
Afonso, A., Gomes, P., Rother, P., 2011. Short and Long-run Determinants of 
Sovereign Debt Credit Ratings, International Journal of Finance and Economics, 16 
(1) : 1-15. 
Almeida, Heitor, Igor Cunha, Miguel A. Ferreira, and Filipe Restrepo. 2014. The real 
effects of sovereign credit rating downgrades. Working paper 
Bissoondoyal-Bheenick., E., 2005. An Analysis of the Determinants of Sovereign 
Ratings’’, Global Finance Journal 15, pp. 251-280 
Bond, P., A. Edmans, and I. Goldstein, 2012. The real effects of financial markets. 
Annual Review of Financial Economics 4: 339-360. 
Cantor, Richard and Frank Packer, 1996. Determinants and impact of sovereign credit 
ratings, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review 2, 37-53. 
Durbin, Erik and David Ng, 2005. The sovereign ceiling and emerging market corporate 
bond spreads, Journal of International Money and Finance 24, 631-649. 
Ferri, G., Liu, G., and Stiglitz, J., 1999. The Procyclical Role of Rating Agencies: 
Evidence from the East Asian Crisis, Economic Notes, 3:335-355.  
Fama, E.F., and M. Miller, 1972. The Theory of Finance. New York: Holt, Rinehart & 
Winston.  
Foucault, Thierry, and Laurent Frésard, 2012. Cross listing, investment sensitivity to 
stock price and the learning hypothesis, Review of Financial Studies 25, 3305-3350. 
Goh Jeremy and Louis Ederington, 1999. Cross-sectional variation in the stock market 
reaction to bond rating changes, Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Vol. 26, 
pp. 101-112. 
26 
 
Griffin, P A. and Sanvicente, A Z., (1982). Common stock returns and rating changes: a 
methodological comparison, Journal of Finance 37, pp. 103–119. 
Grossman, S., 1976. On the efficiency of competitive stock markets where trades have 
diverse information. The Journal of Finance 31: 573-585. 
Grossman, S.J., and J.E. Stiglitz, 1980. On the impossibility of informationally efficient 
markets. American Economic Review 70: 393-408. 
Hellwig, M.F., 1980. On the aggregation of information in competitive markets. Journal 
of economic theory 22: 477-498.  
Holthausen, R W. and Leftwich, R W., (1986). The effect of bond rating changes on 
common stock prices, Journal of Financial Economics 17, pp. 57–89. 
Kaminsky, Graciela, and Sergio Schmukler, 2002. Emerging Market Instability: Do 
Sovereign Ratings Affect Country Risk and Stock Returns? World Bank Economic 
Review 16, 171–195. 
Sy, Amadou, 2003. Rating the Rating Agencies: Anticipating Currency Crises or  Debt 
Crises, IMF working paper No. 03/122. 
 
 
